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Niccolò Machiavelli--Adviser of Princes1
PHILIP J. KAIN, Santa Clara University

I
In Plato's Republic, Socrates argued that true artisans work not in their own interest but
for the good of that upon which they practice their art. So the true ruler is one who works
for the good of the city or the citizens, not the ruler's own self-interest.2 Many would
hold, with Leo Strauss, that Machiavelli contends the very opposite--that for him the true
prince ruthlessly seeks self-interest and personal power.3 I think this is too simple a
reading of Machiavelli.
I do not want to argue that Machiavelli is not a Machiavellian--that he does not
counsel evil. But I do want to argue that Machiavelli's advice to the prince is to avoid
self-interest. The prince is encouraged to act for the good of the state. It is true that in
Machiavelli's opinion this will often require doing evil, and it is also true, one must
admit, that Machiavelli does not really expect the prince to succeed in avoiding selfinterest. It will take us a while to sort out and explain all the complexities that are
involved here, but let us begin by simply noticing that Machiavelli frequently says that
one should work for the "common good" or the "benefit of the state" rather than for
"private ambition" or for one's "party."4 Machiavelli repeatedly indicates his opposition
to self-interest. He praises the actions of Pope Julius and says, "so much the more credit
to him inasmuch as he did it all to exalt the Church and not any individual."5 He
denounces the use of mercenaries because they are self-interested and disloyal.6
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Moreover, he counsels against ministers who seek their own profit rather than loyally
serve their prince.7
Machiavelli says that it is important for a prince to appear

merciful, trustworthy, humane, blameless, religious--and to be so--yet to be in such
measure prepared in mind that if you need to be not so, you can and do change to
the contrary. And it is essential to realize this: that a prince … [is] often forced, in
order to keep his position, to act contrary to truth, contrary to charity, contrary to
humanity, contrary to religion. Therefore he must have a mind ready to turn in any
direction as Fortune's winds and the variability of affairs require …8
The prince must be able to change with the wind so as to do what the situation
demands, not what the prince wants. The prince must not be committed to virtue
inflexibly. But just as much, it very clearly follows, though Machiavelli does not
explicitly say so here, princes should not be locked into a concern for their own narrow
self-interest either or the prince will be inflexible and thus unable to change with the
wind--do what the situation demands. The prince must acquire power and "understand
when to use it and when not to use it, in accord with necessity."9
While it is quite true that princes must be concerned with power, it does not at all
follow that they must be narrowly concerned with personal power. The prince must study
power in the large, not just seek personal power. We must envision political power as a
field of forces interacting, clashing, and in conflict--a very dangerous field in which you
can easily be destroyed if you do not know what you are doing. The prince must study
and come to understand this dynamic of forces. The prince should have "no other object
and no other interest and [take] as his profession nothing else than war and its laws and
discipline … when princes are more interested in luxuries than in arms they lose their
positions."10 The prince must view this dynamic of forces the way a scientist would, or--
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if that carries too much unnecessary freight--the way an artisan or a technician would.
The prince must come to understand what the situation allows, what it necessitates, must
know how to carry this out, and nothing must be allowed to get in the way, including selfinterest. Many have likened Machiavelli to a scientist and this has meant various things
to them. I have something very limited in mind. I certainly do not want to suggest a
Kuhnian notion of paradigms or anything else that modern. I have in mind an older
notion of science, one even that would be compatible with a commitment to astrology--as
Parel so impressively argues was the case for Machiavelli and many other Renaissance
figures.11 All I mean to imply by 'science' is a lack of self-interest or concern for personal
advantage, a cold, objective study of the object, an attitude of analyzing, discovering,
calculating, and then doing what the situation--what necessity--demands, and the putting
aside of all else, or at least subordinating it to this goal.
Machiavelli also says that the prince must learn to use cruelty well.12 Here, as
elsewhere, he is being reductive. When the prince looks at anything, the prince must not
be concerned with its intrinsic value--its own goodness or badness. The only thing the
prince should be concerned with is the way the thing can be used. Everything must be
viewed--radically and completely--from the perspective of its use in the field of power
and from no other perspective. You must understand what the situation makes possible
and do what the situation demands, what is necessary, not what you want. You cannot
lock yourself into personal interests or you risk blinding yourself to what is going on in
the power field and losing your flexibility. You must view everything as something to be
used. Suppose, for example, that as a prince you desire wealth, and at this moment have
an opportunity to get it. You have to ask what is involved. How will it affect the
dynamics of power? How will it affect relations with your enemies? Now? In the
future? There are many things to consider. It may be that this power calculation requires
that you avoid wealth. Or it may, ironically, require that you make yourself wealthy--but
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for reasons of power that have nothing to do with your self-interest. You may need this
wealth to build and maintain an army.
I suppose that any individual who wants to enter the political arena and try to become
a prince will very likely be motivated by a concern for personal power, wealth, selfinterest, and the like. But Machiavelli is suggesting, I think, that anyone who wishes to
be a successful prince has to learn to put aside these personal concerns which are very
dangerous. The prince must do what the situation demands, not what the prince wants.
At first, I suppose, princes will think that, yes, they will have to put aside their selfinterest for a time, until they get solidly in power, and that then they will be able to get
what they want. This too is an illusion. You never just get power. It is not something
you have or possess. It is a dynamic that you must continuously study, be wary of, and be
careful with. You will always have to do what the situation demands--not what you
want.
One might find this interpretation a bit unrealistic. Real princes just do pursue their
own self-interest. No doubt they do, and I do not think Machiavelli is unaware of this. In
fact, I think that Machiavelli does not really expect to see that many princes actually
succeed in avoiding self-interest. What is he doing then? Let me try to uncover
something in Machiavelli's text and defend my interpretation more convincingly at a
higher level. In the Prince, the main focus certainly seems to be on the prince. But
really, a moment's reflection will show that while this is correct, it is not exactly correct.
What is going on in the text is that advice is being given to a prince by an adviser. The
adviser is always present in the text; it is just that you never notice him. He is like the
photographer behind the camera, who is not there when we look at the photograph.
At any rate, I think it is quite clear that the aims of the adviser--Machiavelli's aims--are
not self-interest, personal power, or wealth. His aims--as commentator after commentator
would concede--are the good of Florence, the good of Italy, the common good. And
Machiavelli gives this same advice to the prince, namely, that the prince should not
4

pursue self-interest but benefit Italy as a whole, and that as a first step toward achieving
the common good the prince should run the barbarian, the French, out of Italy.13
I do not intend to take up the question of whether it is possible to completely
overcome self-interest. That is not Machiavelli's point. His point is simply that to the
degree that you follow narrow self-interest you become inflexible, and his ideal is to
ignore self-interest as far as is possible so as to calculate scientifically. At any rate, even
if it is not realistic to believe that a prince would put aside self-interest, I think it is
believable that Machiavelli, the adviser, the theorist, the scientist, would try to put aside
self-interest and do what the situation demands--or at least that is very clearly his ideal.
In this sense it is possible that the Prince is really about the adviser as much as or even
more than it is about the prince.
Once we have spotted this adviser, behind the camera as it were, we are driven to ask a
new set of questions. Just as we must say that this text is not just about the prince but
about the adviser and the prince, so it clearly follows that the text cannot be just about
how the prince should act, but also about how the adviser should act. This opens up a
whole range of issues that to my knowledge have not been addressed before.
How should the adviser act? The adviser first appears in the dedication of the Prince
humbly begging Lorenzo de'Medici for a job, presenting himself as someone the prince
can use.14 Indeed, Machiavelli's general view seems to be that advisers should serve their
princes loyally and devotedly, that the good minister "should never think of himself but of
his prince … "15 Is there anyone naive enough to believe this? Is there anyone who has
so poorly followed the argument as not to see the contradiction involved here? The
advice of this adviser has been that the prince simply cannot be virtuous; the prince
simply cannot afford loyalty, fidelity, and mercy; it is simply necessary to "betray friends,
to be without fidelity, without mercy"16 when the situation demands. Can this same
adviser, then, when it comes to his own behavior, contradict all this advice and lock
himself into strict loyalty, devotion, and virtue? Can that even occur to him? Throughout
5

the text the adviser has been telling the prince to use everything, to calculate power, to do
whatever the situation demands. Can we really believe that this adviser would not use the
prince if the situation demanded it?
In the last chapter of the Prince, Machiavelli again, as in the dedication, directly
addresses Lorenzo de'Medici. He calls on him to free Italy from the barbarian. He
flatters Lorenzo by suggesting that Lorenzo is capable of accomplishing this glorious
deed.17 And, as in the dedication, it may seem as if Machiavelli is begging Lorenzo--to
employ Machiavelli, to help free Italy, to get rid of the French. It may seem that in
flattering Lorenzo, Machiavelli is trying to appear loyal and devoted. All of this, it is
true, is present--on the surface. But beneath the surface, something else is clearly going
on. Commentators have never failed to notice the intensity of the patriotic fervor that
emerges in this last chapter. It does not go too far to say that Italy is what Machiavelli
cares most about, more even than about getting a position with the Medici, and certainly
more than about the Medici themselves--who, after all, fired him and had him tortured.
Machiavelli is careful to preserve the appearance, in this last chapter, of offering to serve
Lorenzo, of letting himself be used by the Medici to achieve the glorious purpose of
freeing Italy. But actually it is Machiavelli who is trying to use Lorenzo--use him to
achieve the end to which he is truly loyal and devoted--the freeing of Italy from the
barbarian. The desire to use the Medici is certainly apparent--at least once one learns to
look for it--in the underlying stance of this last chapter. Machiavelli, I think, would like
to make it true in fact. And can we fail to believe that if the situation demanded it, and if
it were possible, Machiavelli would work to get one prince eliminated and to install a new
more capable one? In short, the adviser would act precisely in accord with the advice that
he has given to the prince. It is just that the adviser will remain in the background,
behind the camera. I see no evidence that Machiavelli would like to be prince himself.
He prefers to be hidden. One can often play the game even more effectively and securely
from there. Machiavelli wants the prince to act like a scientist, to put aside self-interest
6

as well as virtue and to do what the objective situation demands. If the prince will not or
cannot do this, then the adviser--Machiavelli himself--will. He will even put aside the
prince.
Once we notice this hidden dimension of Machiavelli's thought, other passages start to
come into clearer focus and begin to reinforce this reading. Machiavelli tells us, in
discussing ministers, that the minister has the prince's "existence in his hands".18 He also
says that "a prince who is not wise himself cannot be advised well, unless indeed by
chance he turns himself over to a single person--a very prudent man--who entirely
controls him. In this case he really could get good advice, but not for long, because that
tutor in a short time would take his position away from him."19 In this masterful little
passage, Machiavelli admits to all I have been saying, but does it in such a way as to
prevent the naive reader from suspecting that this is what Machiavelli has in mind
himself. He actually warns the prince against those who would do the sort of thing he
would like to do and so the prince never suspects that he would like to do it. He advises
the prince not to be controlled by advisers who would dominate the prince, which itself is
a way for this adviser to control and dominate the prince. But then, after all, Machiavelli
himself tells us that he wants to "write something useful to whoever understands it … "20
Fair is fair.
In the Art of War, Fabrizio says, "In Italy, then, to know how to manage an army
already formed is not enough; a general must first know how to form it and then know
how to command it."21 Fabrizio then goes on to construct in imagination an army, much
as Machiavelli constructs his prince. Fabrizio then says that the Italians do not have wise
princes, "Yet the people are not to blame, but certainly their princes are to blame, who
have been punished, and for their ignorance have received the fitting penalty of losing
their states ignominiously, and without doing any courageous deed."22 So this adviser
constructs an ideal army and an ideal general, criticizes Italian princes for not living up to
this ideal, and says that they therefore deserve to lose their cities. He does not say that he
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would act to help take their cities away from them and replace them with better leaders,
but does he need to say this for it to be true?
What we must also notice here is that Machiavelli, like his character Fabrizio,
theoretically constructs the prince--which certainly subordinates the prince to the theorist
at least in theory, and if the theorist is good enough may even subordinate the prince to
the theorist in actuality. The adviser is like a sculptor, Fabrizio says, who makes a statue
from marble in the rough.23
Machiavelli says that in ancient Rome, love of country was more important than any
other consideration.24 It seems to me that Machiavelli himself also believes this.
Moreover, Machiavelli is even willing to defend Brutus on these grounds. He argues that
Brutus acted for his country rather than out of self-interest.25 In the History of Florence,
Machiavelli also mentions a relative, one Girolamo Machiavelli:

So when the government had been taken over and the balía and then the chief
magistrates selected according to the desire of the few, in order with terror to give a
beginning to the government which they had set up by force, they banished Messer
Girolamo Machiavelli with some others, and also deprived many of their offices.
This Messer Girolamo, who did not keep the rules of his banishment, was declared
a rebel; and as he went traveling around Italy, stirring up the princes against his own
city, he was arrested in Lunigiana through the treachery of one of those lords; being
taken to Florence, he was put to death in prison.26
Indeed, one could say that Girolamo was trying to use any prince he could to benefit
his city. One suspects that Machiavelli models himself on people like Girolamo and
Brutus. Or perhaps he is trying to do them one better. Rather than just assassinate the
tyrant or appeal to other princes to do so, Machiavelli tries to use the very prince who
fired him and had him tortured in order to save Florence and even Italy.27
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II
We must now focus on something that has been emerging here for some time. For
Machiavelli there is a fundamental distinction between appearance and reality, and this
distinction permeates all politics. The prince must appear moral, concerned with justice,
committed to fairness, and so forth, but in reality the prince must be concerned only with
a cold calculation of power dynamics--with what the situation demands. So, if one of
your citizens comes to court to make a complaint and plead for justice, you had better
appear to listen carefully to the complaint, consider it fairly, and dispense justice. But
that is the last thing the prince should really be doing, "there is such a difference between
how men live and how they ought to live that he who abandons what is done for what
ought to be done learns his destruction rather than his preservation … "28 The prince had
better be calculating power dynamics and had better do what the situation, what necessity,
demands.
Machiavelli tells us a story about Cesare Borgia, who, after conquering Romagna,
put in charge there Messer Remirro de Orco, a man cruel and ready, to whom he
gave the most complete authority. This man in a short time rendered the province
peaceful and united, gaining enormous prestige. Then the Duke decided there was
no further need for such boundless power … And because he knew that past
severities had made some men hate him, he determined to purge such men's minds
and win them over entirely by showing that any cruelty which had gone on did not
originate with himself but with the harsh nature of his agent. So getting an
opportunity for it, one morning at Cesena he had Messer Remirro laid in two pieces
in the public square with a block of wood and a bloody sword near him. The
ferocity of this spectacle left those people at the same time gratified and awestruck.29
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Borgia himself was really responsible for Remirro's cruelty, was really concerned with
nothing but questions of power, but was able to appear to the people to be just, which was
the very last thing he was in reality. So also the adviser, if he cannot remain completely
unnoticed behind the camera, would like to appear as a humble, loyal, and devoted
servant, who, as it seems in the last chapter of the Prince, only wishes his master's glory.
But this is a mere screen behind which the adviser tries to manipulate the prince for the
good of Italy. And it seems to me that Machiavelli would be willing to take as severe
measures as did Cesare Borgia if it were necessary and if it were possible. In general, it is
necessary that the prince--and even more so the adviser--appear to have certain virtues,
but in reality be ready to change with the wind and to do what the situation demands.30

III
We must now try to sort out finally what all we have said means for the vexed problem of
how Machiavelli stands with respect to good and evil, an issue that so many
commentators disagree so radically about. I do not think Machiavelli was a "Machiavel,"
the sort of ruthless, self-interested demon in pursuit of personal power, wealth, and
position that one finds so often in Elizabethan drama, and which one finds echoed in a
modern mode, at least at times, in authors like Strauss31 and even, in certain ways, in
Hulliung.32 It is not that I think Machiavelli does not counsel evil--I definitely agree that
he does. It is that, as I have tried to argue, he does not counsel self-interested evil. He is
very much concerned with the good of Italy, or at least of Florence, and thus with what
the situation demands--with necessity--which at times, however, will require that one do
evil.
However, there are several ways of reacting against and rejecting the Elizabethan
interpretation that I think are quite unacceptable. One is to argue that Machiavelli is
fundamentally and ultimately a patriot. The argument goes something like this.
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Machiavelli's ultimate purpose is to work for the common good, which requires as a first
step freeing Italy from the barbarian. It is true that to achieve the common good in
politics will at times require one to do what would otherwise be considered evil. But
since it is for the common good, this evil is acceptable. A good end morally justifies evil
means.
I agree that Machiavelli is a patriot. That is impossible to deny after reading the last
chapter of the Prince. I also agree that his ultimate end is to work for the common good.
It is also obvious that it is Machiavelli's view that to achieve the common good one must
at times do what is evil. Where I disagree, and where I think Machiavelli disagrees, has
to do with the claim that any of this morally justifies evil. I agree with Donaldson on this
point.33 For Machiavelli, one must do this evil, it is necessary, but it is still evil. It is
justified perhaps in a political sense; it is what the prince must do. But it is not morally
justified. It does not cease to be evil. It does not become good. In general, I will try to
argue below, Machiavelli is not a utilitarian or a moral consequentialist in ethics. If an
action has certain desirable consequences, it may be politically necessary to perform that
action. But that does not make the action moral. If it is evil, it remains evil.
At any rate, it is not at all the case that in the last chapter of the Prince Machiavelli is
a patriot and not a Machiavellian. He is both. He is both a patriot who wants to free Italy
and a Machiavellian willing to manipulate the prince in any way necessary in order to free
Italy. I think there is widespread misunderstanding of this last chapter that takes the form
of thinking that because Machiavelli is clearly saying one thing he cannot also be saying
another. I will cite other examples as we go.
The second way that some have traditionally tried to avoid the Elizabethan
interpretation of Machiavelli is to argue that he is a scientist, that he takes a cold,
detached, objective attitude toward things, that he studies them as a technician, and that
this allows him to be amoral. As Cassirer put it:
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All these counsels are "hypothetical imperatives," … "there is no question whether
the end is rational and good, but only what one must do in order to attain it. The
precepts for the physician to make his patient thoroughly healthy, and for a poisoner
to ensure certain death, are of equal value in this respect, that each serves to effect
its purpose perfectly." These words describe exactly the attitude and method of
Machiavelli. He never blames or praises political actions; he simply gives a
descriptive analysis of them--in the same way in which a physician describes the
symptoms of a certain illness.… Machiavelli studied political actions in the same
way as a chemist studies chemical reactions. Assuredly a chemist who prepares in
his laboratory a strong poison is not responsible for its effects. In the hands of a
skilled physician the poison may save the life of a man--in the hands of a murderer
it may kill. In both cases we cannot praise or blame the chemist.34
As Strauss describes this position, Machiavelli abstracts from morality.35 He is
beyond good and evil. He is concerned only with scientific objectivity and technical
necessity. I agree that Machiavelli is a scientist in the sense that he wants to analyze
power dynamics, carefully study in a technical fashion what the objective situation
demands, and discover what is necessary. And he thinks that the successful prince must
act in accord with necessity, unhindered by any moral qualms. So far, I agree that this is
Machiavelli's position. But if from here one wants to make a further leap, which I think
is totally unjustified, and claim that the scientist Machiavelli is blameless, then one is just
not reasoning correctly. Certainly Machiavelli tells us that the attitude of the prince must
be objective, scientific, calculative--that the prince's decisions should not be influenced
by morality, that the prince must do what the situation demands. In other words, in
deciding what to do the prince must abstract from what is morally good or evil. The
prince must not consider these things. I agree that this is what Machiavelli counsels. But
this certainly does not mean that we should hold that the prince is morally justified in
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abstracting from morality. Political necessity requires abstracting from morality. One is
perhaps politically justified in abstracting from morality. It is what the prince or the
adviser must do. But it is not moral to do so. It is highly immoral to abstract from
morality in this way and Machiavelli himself continuously tells us so.
There is also, we might notice, a fundamental disagreement between those who view
Machiavelli as a scientist and those who view him as a patriot. These two positions are
usually thought to be incompatible. Wolin, for example, suggests that the picture of
Machiavelli as a scientist dedicated to objective methods, a man with no moral passions,
will not fit the last chapter of the Prince where we find the expression of fervent
nationalism.36 I think the last chapter is the very best example of the calculating scientist
who is willing to manipulate the Medici in a cold, ruthless, instrumental fashion in order
to accomplish what so passionately concerns him--saving Italy. I do not think that
Machiavelli is a dispassionate scientist as opposed to a passionate and committed patriot.
I do not think these are opposed at all, and I think the last chapter of the Prince is the
best example of how for Machiavelli they are combined.
There is another way of trying to avoid the Elizabethan interpretation. This is to argue
that for Machiavelli there are two forms of morality--ordinary Christian morality and a
traditional, pagan morality of virtù. Machiavelli only counsels evil by the standards of
Christian morality, which he is out to transcend and replace with pagan virtù. By the
standards of traditional, pagan morality, Machiavelli's counsels are not at all evil but
perfectly virtuous. For Isaiah Berlin, Machiavelli institutes

a differentiation between two incompatible ideals of life, and therefore two
moralities. One is the morality of the pagan world: its values are courage, vigour,
fortitude in adversity, public achievement, order, discipline, happiness, strength,
justice, above all assertion of one's proper claims and the knowledge and power
needed to secure their satisfaction … Against this moral universe … stands in the
13

first and foremost place, Christian morality. The ideals of Christianity are charity,
mercy, sacrifice, love of god, forgiveness of enemies, contempt for the goods of this
world, faith in the life hereafter, belief in the salvation of the individual soul as
being of incomparable value--higher than, indeed wholly incommensurable with,
any social or political or other terrestrial goal, any economic or military or aesthetic
consideration.37
Parel too holds a version of this position. He shows that Machiavelli was committed
to astrology and that for many Renaissance thinkers including Kepler and Brahe astrology
was part and parcel of science. Parel then argues that astrology was incompatible with
Christianity but compatible with pagan virtù, and he concludes that therefore Machiavelli
rejects the former and embraces the latter.38 I agree that in many cases it is clear that
Machiavelli believes that the prince must act in accordance with traditional virtù. The
prince must be concerned with honor and glory, and this will frequently require the prince
to violate Christian morality. Moreover, this is often what Machiavelli means when he
tells us that it is necessary to do evil. But I do not think that Machiavelli wants to just
eliminate Christian morality or simply replace it with pagan virtù. I do not think that
Machiavelli is ultimately committed to virtù nor that Machiavelli totally rejects Christian
morality. I will give further reasons for this below, but to start with, it is essential to see
at least that the prince cannot simply discount Christian morality. It is a part of the world
the prince lives in. Other people are committed to it. It is then, at least, a factor that must
be taken into consideration when analyzing power. The prince may well have to appear
to respect, and, indeed, appear to possess, many Christian virtues. But, of course, the
prince must not be locked inflexibly into Christian morality. The prince must be free to
violate Christian morality when necessary. It may seem, then, that virtù is the reality
behind the appearance. Christian morality is for public consumption; it is an appearance
which the situation demands be kept up; but in reality the prince is motivated by
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principles of virtù. I do not think this is correct. In the first place, virtù can be a part of
the realm of appearance rather than reality. If one must violate Christian morality, then it
may be very helpful to appear to act in accordance with pagan virtù-- the populace might
well be more willing to tolerate the violation of Christian morality if it is done in a
glorious and honorable way. I will return to this and discuss an example in a moment. In
the second place, I do not think that Machiavelli is ultimately committed to virtù because
there will simply be many situations in which one must violate principles of virtù. In
Chapter 8 of the Prince, Machiavelli writes: "It cannot, however, be called virtue [virtù ]
to kill one's fellow-citizens, to betray friends, to be without fidelity, without mercy,
without religion; such proceedings enable one to gain sovereignty, but not fame."39 Such
actions, Machiavelli is saying, not only violate Christian morality, they violate the
principles of virtù. And doesn't the prince, whenever the situation demands, have to kill
citizens, betray friends, be without fidelity and without mercy? Isn't that what
Machiavelli repeatedly counsels? Doesn't the prince have to "have a mind ready to turn
in any direction as Fortune's winds and the variability of affairs require"?40 The prince
can no more be inflexibly committed to virtù than to self-interest or Christian morality.
If virtù is, at least sometimes, the reality behind the appearance of Christian morality,
which will often require the violation of Christian morality, then, in my view, it is the
cold, calculated, scientific analysis of power that is the reality behind the appearance of
virtù, and which will often require the violation of principles of virtù.
Let us take as an example the passage quoted above in Section II: Cesare Borgia uses
Remirro de Orco to ruthlessly unify Romagna and then has Remirro cut in two pieces and
displayed in the public square. This brutal treatment certainly violates Christian morality,
whereas it seems to affirm pagan virtù. It is virtù because it is a righting of wrongs, a
dispensing of justice--in the form of revenge. Borgia courageously, forcefully, keeps
faith with the people and removes Remirro, the cause of their suffering--or so it appears.
This sort of virtù, presumably, at least to some extent excuses the violation of Christian
15

morality in the eyes of the populace. An evil oppressor has been removed. But notice
also that to some extent Christian morality is taken seriously as a real force in the world
and the importance of appearance is affirmed. Borgia conceals the fact that he was the
one who had Remirro killed. Everyone knows it, but presumably they cannot prove it.
There is a certain restraint here, a certain respect for Christian morality, for appearances,
limited though it may be. Borgia does not take vengeance completely in the open.
Vengeance or virtù seems to remain the reality behind the appearance, but at the same
time we must admit that it itself appears. Perhaps we could put it a bit differently: Virtù
is supposed to appear as the reality behind the appearance. What is supposed to appear
to the populace is that Borgia ruthlessly and immorally (in the Christian sense--though
not openly) cuts Remirro down because Borgia is an honorable man of virtù.
But if we know what actually happened, then we know that in reality Borgia is not a
man of virtù at all. Borgia sent Remirro to Romagna in the first place and ordered him to
ruthlessly pacify the province. Borgia himself is responsible for the suffering in
Romagna. And after Remirro does exactly what Borgia wanted--does his job excellently-Borgia betrays him. Borgia is not a man of honor--he possesses no virtù --at least not in
this case. Borgia engages in a cold, calculated analysis of power; he uses people; he does
what is necessary. In doing so, he violates Christian morality and he violates virtù.
Ultimately, he is committed to neither. However, to do what the situation demands, he
must be seriously concerned with both Christian morality and virtù at the level of
appearances. Grand and virtuous action can excuse evil at the level of Christian morality
in the eyes of the populace and virtù can keep hidden the cold, calculation of power that
could be quite harmful to the prince if it were to become visible.
So instead of a simple distinction between appearance and reality, I think we must
begin to see that what we have here are many different layers--we have a series of screens
that separate each level of appearance from a deeper reality, and then that reality can be
seen to be an appearance behind which an even deeper reality lurks. In my view, both
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Christian morality and virtù are appearances and the scientific calculation of power
dynamics is reality. Yet, I suppose, there is even a sense in which scientific calculation
too is an appearance. In advising the prince, Machiavelli will try to teach the prince to
perceive necessity, to do what the situation demands, to scientifically analyze power
dynamics. At one level, Machiavelli is trying to admit the prince to the inner sanctum of
reality. But the prince may be a beginner, or may be too self-interested, or simply not
capable. The adviser may someday have to cut down the prince the way Borgia cut down
Remirro--though, no doubt, in a much less dramatic and visible fashion. The adviser
wants to remain behind the camera--he must conceal his scientific ruthlessness from the
prince. I suggest that one way in which he does this is by counseling the prince to be
scientific, by adopting a scientific attitude, by always focusing on the objective situation,
by emphasizing external necessity. In this way, he draws the prince's attention away from
himself, the adviser, the theorist, the person who may have to decide one day that he must
cut down the prince. At this level, science--the science that the prince learns, the science
that the prince is able to grasp--is mere appearance. Reality is grasped by a higher
science, or a better understood science, or a science practiced by a more adept scientist, a
science that may have to be used against the prince.
Skinner thinks that the Prince is written within the mirror-for-princes tradition; it
holds "up a 'mirror' to princes, presenting them with an ideal image and asking them to
seek their reflection in its depths."41 I do not want to disagree with this exactly, but I very
definitely disagree that the Prince is written straightforwardly, directly, naively for the
prince, that, as Skinner puts it, Machiavelli thinks that the "best education for a prince
would simply consist in memorising The Prince … "
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To put my objection another

way, the Prince, if it is a mirror, does not simply reflect without distortion. If it is a
mirror, it is being used the way a magician uses a mirror, to deceive, to control, to
manipulate what appears to an audience, and to conceal reality. In that sense the Prince
is a mirror-for-princes, but I do not think that is what Skinner has in mind.
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A better view, I think, is found in a very interesting book by Donaldson, who shows
how Machiavelli's thought was taken as arcana, that is, the sort of strategic wisdom that
in order to work has to be kept secret. Arcane wisdom could take many forms. Some
argued that Machiavelli put things in the Prince that if followed would actually work to
destroy the prince--the prince that Machiavelli so hated. For others, Machiavelli's
purpose in the Prince was to reveal arcane wisdom, that is, to reveal the tyranny of the
tyrant. Arcane wisdom can also be a wisdom that is intended to conceal as much as it
reveals.43 Indeed, if Machiavelli is attempting to reveal the evil of the prince or to give
advice that would destroy the prince, Machiavelli is doing this at least in part, I think, to
conceal the adviser. He keeps our attention on the prince and off the adviser. At any rate,
there is no direct mirroring here--there is arcane concealment.
One last way of trying to avoid the Elizabethan interpretation is to argue that
Machiavelli is a utilitarian or a consequentialist.44 Parel, for example, thinks that for
Machiavelli, if something serves the state, it cannot be evil.45 This may seem to be
Machiavelli's view, as when he says,

Cesare Borgia was thought cruel; nevertheless that well-known cruelty of his reorganized Romagna, united it, brought it to peace and loyalty. If we look at this
closely, we see that he was much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to
escape being called cruel, allowed the ruin of Pistoia.… he is more merciful than
those who, through too much mercy, let evils continue, from which result murders
or plunder, because the latter commonly harm a whole group, but those executions
that come from the prince harm individuals only.46
We must notice, however, that Machiavelli does not actually say that good
consequences transform cruel acts into morally acceptable ones. He only says that
Borgia's acts had consequences which were not as bad as those of the acts of Florence.
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He definitely does not say that Borgia's acts were moral--and I do not think he believes
they were. Nor does Machiavelli say this even in the following passage: "Nor will a
prudent intellect ever censure anyone for any unlawful action used in organizing a
kingdom or setting up a Republic. It is at any rate fitting that though the deed accuses
him, the result should excuse him; and when it is good, like that of Romulus, it will
always excuse him, because he who is violent to destroy, not he who is violent to restore,
ought to be censured."47 Machiavelli clearly holds that at times evil acts are necessary;
they must be done; and thus are to be approved or excused--I would say--politically. But
this is not to say that they are morally justified. Perhaps Machiavelli slips from time to
time. He does quote Livy to the effect that "a war is just for those to whom it is necessary
… ",48 though this does occur in the last chapter of the Prince where he is trying to
manipulate the Medici. At any rate, I think Machiavelli is usually very clear about the
difference between political necessity, which must be done, and which therefore gains
political approval or acceptance, and something which is totally different--what is moral.
We can see this even in his hesitations. He speaks of "cruelties badly used or well used.
Well used we call those (if of what is bad we can use the word well) … "49 In other
words, though he does it continually, he still feels that it is questionable to use value
terms like "well" of acts which are evil.
Machiavelli, in my view, very clearly sees the difference between good and evil. No
one sees it more clearly. He thinks that at times the prince must do evil. But unlike many
others, at this point Machiavelli does not begin to fudge. Evil does not become good--it
remains evil. Machiavelli tells us that Cesare Borgia is highly worthy of imitation by
aspiring princes.50 Yet I think there is no question but that Machiavelli presents Borgia
as evil--certainly when Borgia betrays Remirro and has him cut in half. Machiavelli
makes no attempt to conceal this evil or even soften it. Moreover, generally speaking,
Machiavelli does not pull his punches linguistically. He says simply and
straightforwardly that the prince "must acquire the power to be not good … " 51 and that
19

the prince must "know how to enter into evil … "52 Just because something is necessary
does not change the fact that it is evil.53 Evil is even necessary, in Machiavelli's view, to
advance or preserve the common good--after all it is a theological truism that God can
bring good out of evil. But this does not change the fact that evil is evil. It does not
become good.
I think that Machiavelli's views on good and evil are best captured in a passage from
the Mandragola where Callimaco says, "the worst you can get from it is that you'll die
and go to Hell. But how many others have died! And in Hell how many worthy men
there are! Are you ashamed to go there?"54 This is to say that good and evil are
absolutes. Evil is objectively, absolutely, God-ordained evil. There is no utilitarian or
consequentialist slight of hand possible here--evil cannot be turned into good. If you do
evil, you go to hell. Period. But, nevertheless, it is necessary to do evil. So you accept
that; you do the evil; and then you must bravely accept hell. After all there are some very
worthy people there.55 There is a good deal of virtù involved here. The bravado
involved in accepting hell is even rather impressive. Nevertheless, it is absolutely clear
that such virtù does not get you out of hell. Evil is evil. You have done evil and you
remain in hell. Here, very interestingly, the screens have shifted. It is no longer the case
that Christian morality is a mere appearance behind which lurks the reality of virtù. Virtù
has become the appearance, or the keeping up of appearances. And Christian hell, we
ultimately see, is reality.
This is not an isolated instance that can just be attributed to Callimaco instead of
Machiavelli. Several of Machiavelli's biographers tell us that on his deathbed he related
the following story.56 I quote de Grazia's version:

He sees a long file of people, ragged, sick, weak, and weary. Asking who they are,
he is told that they are the blessed of paradise whom one reads about in scripture:
"Blessed are the poor for theirs in the kingdom of heaven." As they fade from sight
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he sees gathering a group of impressive persons in courtly attire, walking and
gravely discussing matters of state. Among them he recognizes Plato, Plutarch,
Livy, Tacitus, and other famous men of antiquity. These, he is told, are the damned
of hell, because it is written: "The wisdom of this world is the enemy of God." As
they stroll off, Niccolò hears himself being asked: "With whom would you rather
go?" "Me?" he said, "I am not tagging along with those ragbags to go to paradise. I
am staying with that other company, to talk about the state and go to hell."57

I think Machiavelli believes in hell. It is true that he is not a very religious man, but he
is not an atheist. As de Grazia so elegantly puts it, "The most his enemies can say is that
while he does not lack faith, there is not much to spare."58 Machiavelli's brother, Totto,
was a priest, and Machiavelli never challenges the existence of the clergy, the papacy, or
the church.59 Moreover, he never attacks Christian dogma.60 On his deathbed, Ridolfi
and Villari tell us, he confessed his sins to Frà Mateo.61 Machiavelli, as far as I can see,
believes in hell. He thinks that evil is evil and that it sends one to hell. Nevertheless, he
thinks that it is necessary to do evil and thus accept hell. He does not have that modern
ability to cheat and to transform evil into good.
What does it mean to say that something is morally evil but politically necessary? It
means that if you are a prince or an adviser you must do it to achieve certain results; it is
necessary; political imperatives require it. However, it cannot be justified morally. This,
certainly, is to say that the prince should not adopt it as a general principle. It is not the
thing to do in all cases. It is evil and thus to be avoided whenever possible. But in some
cases it just cannot be avoided. The prince and the adviser accept the need to do evil and
the necessity to pay for it. Machiavelli is a consequentialist in the political sphere, but
ultimately, and thus really, in the moral and religious spheres he is not a consquentialist at
all but a rather strict deontologist.
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This may seem like a contradiction. If something is evil, let alone if it gets you sent to
hell, we think one simply shouldn't do it. If one should do it, if it is necessary, then it has
to be the moral thing to do. Machiavelli lived in a world in many ways very different
from ours, the world of the Italian Renaissance, where, I think one must say, such
contradiction was at least fairly common. Our drive to unravel such contradiction, while
it shows an admirable concern for logical consistency, will cause us to fail to understand
the Italian Renaissance, which, like many another age, simply lived its own
contradictions. For example, in the History of Florence, Machiavelli tells us of one
Giovannandrea who together with others planned to assassinate Duke Galeazzo and,
indeed, to carry out the act in church. So they arrived at the church early, heard mass
together, and then, believe it or not, they prayed for the success of their assassination
attempt. Burckhardt in The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy mentions this and
other similar cases and suggests that such contradiction was characteristic of the times.62
Perhaps this sort of contradiction is best seen in Marlowe's play Doctor Faustus, written
toward the end of the century. Faustus gives up on medieval religiosity, theology, and
abstract, metaphysical knowledge. He instead seeks practical knowledge, power, and an
enjoyable life. He is modern. He is a Renaissance man. And Marlowe writes this play
so that we cannot help but identify with Faustus and sympathize with him. But at the end
of the play, Faustus is carried off--kicking and screaming--to hell. On the one hand,
Renaissance knowledge, power, and enjoyment are affirmed. We cannot help but believe
in them. On the other hand, they send you to hell. The Renaissance has serious concerns
other than, and incompatible with, religion. But it has not shed religion.
Modern commentators who cannot tolerate such contradiction, who cannot accept that
someone can think that something is evil, yet think you should do it, who cannot accept
that someone could hold that certain deeds will land you in hell, but that they must be
done, such commentators will be driven to explain this contradiction away. They will be
driven to conclude that Machiavelli cannot really believe in hell or that for Machiavelli
22

evil is not really evil--either because Machiavelli is a patriot, a scientist, a pagan, or a
utilitarian. In short, I think that a great many of the disagreements found in Machiavelli
scholarship over the interpretation of his views on good and evil stem from trying to force
a certain kind of consistency on him that is out of place.

Why, then, does Machiavelli insist on calling evil evil and yet sticking with it? One
reason, oddly enough, I think, is because he is so opposed to evil. A decent society, the
sort we all want to live in, a society that realizes the common good, is caught, Machiavelli
thinks, in an irremovable contradiction. To exist, to preserve itself, to achieve the
common good, its political leaders will have to engage, at some time or another, in evil.
It is simply necessary. On the other hand, if this is to be a decent society, there cannot be
people, especially public leaders, engaging in evil. If you really believe that you cannot
produce a good society without at times resorting to evil, but at the same time you realize
that the good society cannot be good if evil acts are being performed in it, then you have a
real contradiction on your hands. What are you to do? The only thing you can do,
Machiavelli thinks, is try to establish a complex distinction between appearance and
reality, a complex series of screens. Evil cannot be allowed to appear in the public arena.
Evil must be hidden from the public and carried out behind the scenes. This is so for two
reasons. The leaders cannot be locked into virtuous acts. They must be willing to do evil
and able to do it well. And if they get caught they may not be able to do it well. So evil
must remain out of the public sphere for the benefit of the ruler--and even more so for the
benefit of the adviser who may use the ruler. But also, secondly, for the benefit of the
ordinary citizen, for the benefit of the good society, evil must not appear in the public
arena. Evil is necessary to create and preserve the good society. But there cannot be evil
going on in that society if it is to be good. So evil must at least remain outside the
ordinary life realm of society, out of the public arena, hidden away behind the scenes. A
contradiction remains here that cannot be finally eliminated. The appearance of its
23

elimination can be created for the ordinary populace by an astute enough prince. But the
prince--or certainly the adviser--must simply live this contradiction, play it, try to conceal
it, try to control it, but he will never be able to eliminate it, and finally will have to pay
the price.
Why is this contradiction uneliminable? Because we do not live in a good world. We
live in a world that is basically evil. We live in a world in which good will be
overpowered by evil--certainly if good confines itself to moral means. Nevertheless,
good is still good, evil is still evil, and the former is to be sought and the latter avoided as
much as is possible. To maximize the good or at least the appearance of good in a
basically evil world we have no other recourse but to use a certain amount of evil while
working effectively to conceal it. That, without any doubt, remains a fundamental
contradiction, but it is the best that we can hope for. And the adviser who serves the
common good in this way, we see, must put aside his self-interest even at the ultimate and
last step. He finally accepts his own condemnation to hell. However, we wonder
whether even hell will finally eliminate this fundamental contradiction. Hell, ultimately
and ontologically, is a realm of evil that is nevertheless home to some very worthy
people. It is almost as if Machiavelli, in conversation with Plato, Plutarch, Livy, Tacitus,
and other famous political theorists of antiquity, will try to carve out the appearance of a
good world at the very center of hell. He will try to create a clearing in the midst of
ontological evil, to maintain the appearance of good, to keep evil back behind a set of
carefully placed screens. Whether or not Machiavelli will be able to accomplish this in
the next world, whether or not the next world even exists, I cannot say, but very clearly
this is what Machiavelli hopes to accomplish in this world, and he thinks it is the greatest
thing that it is possible to accomplish.
I do not at all wish to defend Machiavelli's views on evil or on the necessity of evil.
They are certainly not my views. I do not think good will always be overpowered by evil.
I think, or at least I hope, that moral means can bring about a good society, even if this
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may be extremely difficult to achieve and will be a long time in coming. My tactic would
be the opposite of Machiavelli's. It would be to try to eliminate evil, starting with the
greatest evil, by dragging it out into the full light of day and denying it safe haven behind
the screen. But until we have flushed all evil out into the open and decided that we no
longer need evil to achieve a good society, Machiavelli has a very valuable lesson for us.
Mansfield, in his "Introduction" to the Prince, writes, "One may congratulate an
American citizen for all the advantages to which he is born; but what of the nasty
necessities that prepared this inheritance--the British expelled, Indians defrauded, blacks
enslaved?"63 There are many who will begin sliding here, who will begin to hold that
defrauding Native Americans and enslaving blacks was necessary, at least back then, and
so was, perhaps, not completely bad, if not actually good. Not Machiavelli! It was evil!
During the recent Gulf War, I think one found a lot of people in the United States
thinking as follows: (1) Saddam Hussein is an evil character. (2) It is the duty of the
United States as a nation to stop him. (3) So, the United States must do what is
necessary--bomb him back to the stone age. And (4) this is the moral thing to do. To see
that even if (1), (2), and (3) are true--I am not saying they are, I do not agree with (2) and
I certainly disagree with (3), but even if they were true--it definitely does not follow that
(4) is true. Most people in the United States, it seems to me, who think it was necessary
to invade the Gulf, also think it was moral to do so. I suggest that if they could take the
small step that Machiavelli so clearly took, if they could see and admit to themselves that,
even if it was necessary, it was still deeply evil, they would be a step ahead of where they
are now. There would still be a long way to go, in my opinion, but they would have taken
a small step forward, and the United States would be a somewhat better nation than it is.
This would still fall far short of rejecting evil means altogether, but to see the means we
do use as in fact evil would be a significant improvement over continuing to believe them
moral.
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